It is only when we examine the doctrine in granular casuistical detail that these underlying moral principles become apparent. Once we do, the Palsgraf perspective’s insistence that tort law’s moral core is robustly relational becomes untenable. True, there is a thin sense in which a defendant’s moral liability to compensate a plaintiff (and liability in tort) is “irreducibly relational”354: The defendant must infringe some fact-relative moral right, a moral right against actually being injured, held by the plaintiff. But this is a very thin sense of relationality. It need not involve delivering any “[a]ffront to [the plaintiff’s] personality”355 or subjecting her to an excessive risk of damaging her body or property. The plaintiff might be unforeseeable to the defendant, or the defendant might treat her with all due care — because, say, she has to all reasonable appearances given consent to his action — and yet the defendant may be liable to compensate her, because he has responsibly risked infringing a certain sort of moral right, he did in fact infringe such a right, and the right in question did in fact belong to her.
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